

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET P

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Concurrent Resolution to Support Establishment
of a National Historical Intelligence MuseumSTAT^MActing Director, Office of
External Affairs

NO.

ER 83-1619 OEXA 83-0685

DATE

29 MAR 1983

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALSCOMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)1. *WJC*
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*J - reused version
coordinated w/USA,
DA -**This page it
better -**4/4/83**KJHQ**SEA*
CK

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*3 - revised version
coordinated w/USA,
DA -**This says it
better -**4/4/83**KJHQ**SENT
CK*

PA D. Luby.

24 May 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

STAT FROM: [REDACTED]
Director, Office of External Affairs

SUBJECT: Martin Cramer's Proposed Intelligence Museum

1. Action Requested: None; for information only.

STAT 2. Background: Martin Cramer, who you appropriately referred to
STAT Geoffrey Jones, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] has promoted the development of an intelligence museum for many years. He wrote you on 16 April 1982 asking for support for his long sought intelligence museum. He specifically asked for help in procuring a Federal site or facility, identifying CIA officers to assist him, support of requests for exhibit materials, and advice on approaching people and foundations for assistance.

The notion of an intelligence museum has been considered by successive DCI's since 1969 (see chronology). Cramer's proposal first came to CIA in 1977. After careful study it was determined that it would be inappropriate for CIA officially to sanction and support such a venture. Cramer was encouraged to solicit the help of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers and/or Georgetown University's (Ray Cline's) Center for Strategic and International Studies. AFIO was unwilling or unable to support it then and remains unwilling today. Cline's group, however, formed the National Intelligence Studies Center and named Cramer executive director, where he continued to promote the museum project. I am informed he was recently relieved of his duties and is no longer a member of the Board of NISC. His interest in the museum obviously continues.

The reasons CIA should not sponsor this venture have not changed. Although Federally-sponsored museums exist, there is no known Government agency subsidization of a private museum such as Cramer proposes. The Agency also found--during the Bicentennial and the 1977-78 Outreach program--that it had little to offer in the way of meaningful exhibit materials that were unclassified. More importantly, exhibiting intelligence materials in a museum would send the wrong signal to our foreign friends who we are trying to convince their secrets are safe with us. In addition, possible legal issues notwithstanding, it remains that appropriated funds are not now available and, if requested, would have to compete with other outyear priorities. Finally, it is inevitable that CIA support would forever be perceived as domestic propaganda.

3. The following have participated in looking again at this issue and concur in this position:

STAT




Chief, History Staff
Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection
Director, Center for Studies of Intelligence
Chief, Public Affairs Division
Deputy General Counsel
Special Assistant to the Director

STAT

Chuck Wilson
John Bross

4. Recommendation: None.

STAT




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Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

- 1 - D/OEXA w/backgr.2 - PAD
- 1 - DD/OEXA
- 1 - ER 82-4873/2 w/background
- 1 - OEXA Reg 82-1129/1 w/background

STAT



- 1 - John Bross

STAT

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

82-48371


28 April 1982

Dear Mr. Cramer,

It is nice to hear from you and I am pleased to learn you are retaining your interest in establishing an intelligence museum. The trustees of the newly formed William J. Donovan Foundation are interested in this project, and I suggest you get in touch with Henry Hyde or Geoffrey Jones. Mr. Hyde's telephone number is (212) 628-8480 and Mr. Jones' number is (212) 628-3100.

I have taken the liberty of sending a copy of your letter along to Henry Hyde.

Sincerely,


William J. Casey

Mr. Martin G. Cramer
President, National Historical
Intelligence Museum

STAT

Executive Registry

82-1872

APR 1982

April 16, 1982

OEXA 82-1129

The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

I hope you will agree with me that the time has come to revive one of the projects you and I discussed some years back, the establishment of a National Historical Intelligence Museum. Some of the changes in the intervening years are obvious, such as a change in attitude in both the Executive Branch and the Congress. Expanded educational efforts have helped -- the establishment and nationwide activities of AFIO, the projects of NISC, the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, the Welch Fund, along with expanded outreach efforts of the Agency and some, at least, of the learned and professional societies. Another, very important one is an outpouring of printed and audiovisual materials on which the exhibits of the museum can be based.

We have established the National Historical Intelligence Museum as a non-profit, educational, tax-exempt organization. We are reviewing possible sites in Washington, D.C., Virginia and Pennsylvania. We have a good working board and are beginning to approach people about serving on a general advisory board or specialized advisory panels (ie. history and intelligence). Our fundraising effort is beginning with approaches to selected foundations and individuals. Hopefully, approaches to corporations will follow before too long. We have a proposed budget and reams of raw materials from which museum content can be extracted.

The museum will describe, within appropriate security considerations, significant intelligence achievements, developments and personalities, using a wide variety of visual displays and audio presentations. A summary note on possible content is enclosed for your review.

Such a collection would go far to increase public understanding of the intelligence community and its efforts. The museum would parallel and complement what other museums attempt in related areas - air and space, (Smithsonian and Cape Kennedy) aviation development (Wright Patterson), nuclear

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Mr. Casey

Our thanks for considering these proposals. I should be pleased to forward any further information on proposed content, or in response to any questions you might have.

I know from your historical writing, your continuing interest in NISC and our talks of some years ago, you will give this project a very interested hearing. I hope, working together, we can develop a national intelligence museum, combining private and public efforts, more interesting than the traditional war museums and much more comprehensive than any existing museums in the U.S. with content relating to intelligence.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Martin G. Cramer".

Martin G. Cramer, President
National Historical
Intelligence Museum

cc: Admiral Inman DDCI
John A. Bross

NATIONAL HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM

A NOTE ON CONTENT

Making the museum a heavily historical one has many advantages. It allows us:

1. To provoke thought while interesting (even entertaining) the viewers on some very important points not well understood by many Americans. Dramatic treatments of history - historical novels, docudramas, historical or period films - have huge audiences, as do espionage novels; and nostalgia underlies the appeal of much in continuing education, entertainment and hobbies. All this points to a potentially very wide appeal for exhibits which make general points on intelligence collection, but focus around such dramatic subjects as espionage and colorful secret agents in the American Revolution, the Civil War and since; cryptographic successes, such as the Black Chamber and the Naval Treaty and ENIGMA and ULTRA, and failures (eg. Russia in World War I), aerial and satellite reconnaissance, such as in the U-2 story and the Cuba Missile Crisis; electronic listening as with the Great Seal in the Moscow Embassy, and intercepts, as with tapping the recently - developed telegraph in the Civil War, the Berlin Tunnel and the Zimmerman Telegram; types and variety of agents (eg. Philby, Wennerstrom, Col. Abel, Sorge, Rado, "Cicero") counterintelligence (eg. some of the FBI's more famous older cases, and more recent ones involving both military and civilian agencies and KGB activities more generally).
2. To address such important matters as war and peace, changes in non-democratic governments (succession questions), the impact of some revolutions on US interests, and thus to address general points about early warning analysis, estimates, dissemination, and briefings of top leaders, misconceptions and misjudgements, or failures to disseminate adequately and use available intelligence. Exhibits covering such subjects might center on Pearl Harbor; the beginnings of the Civil War; Arab-Israeli wars; the extravagant expectation of all initial participants in World War I; the wishfulness of the Japanese in World War II; the unwillingness to listen to evidence of Stalin with regard to Hitler's preparations for a massive attack on the Soviet Union, to cite a few arbitrarily chosen examples.

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3. To make some very basic points about intelligence which the knowledgeable take for granted, but are not as well understood generally as they should be. These include:
 - That espionage is an ancient and virtually universal activity.
 - That we Americans owe much to intelligence activities since the time of "George Washington, Spymaster".
 - That although virtually universal, intelligence is also a very "national" type of activity, dictatorships (and before that, absolutist monarchies) approaching it differently than democracies and with even differences among approaches to intelligence among the democracies (eg. the longtime acceptance of a British Official Secrets Act).
4. To address sometimes complex factors underlying the challenge posed by the need to make decisions which depend on an understanding of the probable intentions and likely actions of adversaries, potential adversaries and allies. These could include stereotypical thinking, adoption of important analogies - or failure to adopt them - or even naivete and overconfidence.
5. To make sometimes controversial matters (eg. civil liberties vs. requirements of national security; the role of the courts relative to intelligence, the limits of Congressional oversight; media coverage of intelligence; possible "political" use of intelligence data) clear in a relatively noncontroversial way.
6. To avoid the truly sensitive (eg. in dealing with technology and weaponry in terms of intelligence, or with cryptography).

Finally, in planning for relatively - recent content of the museum we will have to grapple with the fact that even highly - informed people sometimes tend to "define" intelligence differently. The museum's content, will require further discussion and definition. It clearly would include foreign intelligence and counterintelligence and should in our view, include such historical and interesting related activities as deception and forgeries, and escape and evasion. It might or might not, however in dealing with relatively recent events, cover to any extent a number of other subjects, such as counter-insurgency and guerilla warfare, psychological warfare and propaganda and covert political action, except insofar as such activities require good intelligence.

STAT

April 16, 1982

Admiral Bobby Inman
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Admiral Inman:

John Bross has suggested that I send my revived proposal for a National Historical Intelligence Museum to both Mr. Casey and you. Having heard your recent presentation to the State Department Open Forum Panel, I am especially encouraged to do so.

I was impressed with your stress on intelligence as a government-wide matter, and particularly with the points you made on the need for sustained popular support for our intelligence activities and agencies. More specifically, you hit a very responsive cord in this listener through comments that "intelligence has no constituency and urgently needs one", and that we must avoid the historical pattern of building our intelligence capabilities for actual or threatened hostilities and then dismantling them when a specific combat or threat of conflict ends.

As you know, the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), our National Intelligence Study Center, and the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence have all worked to expand popular understanding of intelligence and increase sustained public support for it.

Educating and convincing opinion leaders and a public made skeptical in recent years is neither an easy nor a short-term task, however. It requires institutionalization. One way some of us have been attempting this is through encouragement of both more and more balanced scholarly and popular writing, and more and better coverage in college courses. This letter describes another, complementary approach, establishment of a National Historical Intelligence Museum in a location visited by Americans in search of combination of recreation and their nation's historical heritage.

Page Two
Admiral Inman

We have set up a non-profit, tax-exempt organization and established a working board. We are seeking members for a blue-ribbon advisory board, a site, funds and help from within the Government.

We believe the museum should take a heavily historical approach, and have enclosed some preliminary thoughts on content for your consideration.

We are asking Mr. Casey for his assistance with this project and would be very pleased to have yours, as well as any preliminary comments you might have for us.

Sincerely,

Martin C. Cramer, President
National Historical
Intelligence Museum ✓

CHRONOLOGY OF PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM

- 1969 DCI Helms considered but finally dropped a suggestion to locate a museum at the Smithsonian.
- 1972 DCI Colby established an Intelligence Museum Commission of Agency officers to establish a program for conserving and exhibiting materials. Commission met once but no program developed.
- 1976 DCI Bush considered a nonprofit, private museum and asked the Management Committee to consider it. No record it ever did.
- 1977 DCI Bush turned aside a request from Martin Cramer to serve on an Advisory Board to a museum Cramer was promoting.
- 1979 Martin Cramer, representing the National Intelligence Study Center, came to CIA Public Affairs to solicit help in obtaining U.S. Government funds and other assistance for the purpose of establishing a museum. Public Affairs determined funds could not be made available and CIA cooperation on displays encountered security problems. DCI Turner determined CIA should not be part of project.
- 1979 Martin Cramer sought AFIO assistance but was rebuffed.
- 1982 Cramer, cut loose from NISC attachment, has contacted DCI and DDCI for support, using John Bross as entre. His position has not changed. He wants Government funds, space, and people.
- 1982 AFIO reviewed again and has no interest.

27 April 1982